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Abstract 
The metacognitive ability to introspect about self-performance varies substantially across individuals. 
Given that effective monitoring of performance is deemed important for effective behavioural control, 
intervening to improve metacognition may have widespread benefits, for example in educational and 
clinical settings. However, it is unknown whether and how metacognition can be systematically 
improved through training independently of task performance, or whether metacognitive 
improvements generalize across different task domains. Across 8 sessions, here we provided feedback 
to two groups of participants in a perceptual discrimination task: an experimental group (N = 29) 
received feedback on their metacognitive judgments, while an active control group (N = 32) received 
feedback on their decision performance only. Relative to the control group, adaptive training led to 
increases in metacognitive calibration (as assessed by Brier scores) which generalized both to 
untrained stimuli and an untrained task (recognition memory). Leveraging signal detection modeling 
we found that metacognitive improvements were driven both by changes in metacognitive efficiency 
(meta-d’/d’) and confidence level, and that later increases in metacognitive efficiency were positively 
mediated by earlier shifts in confidence. Our results reveal a striking malleability of introspection and 
indicate the potential for a domain-general enhancement of metacognitive abilities. 
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Introduction 
Metacognition refers to the ability to monitor and introspect upon cognitive performance. An 
individual with good metacognition is aware of fluctuations in task performance, and appropriately 
modulates their confidence level (e.g. holding higher confidence when correct, and lower confidence 
when incorrect). While metacognitive abilities are often treated as stable characteristics of individuals 
(Allen et al., 2016; McCurdy et al., 2013; Fleming et al., 2010; Song et al., 2011), several lines of 
research hint at their malleability. For instance, practicing meditation boosts the accuracy of 
retrospective confidence judgments about recognition memory decisions (Baird et al., 2014) and 
monitoring of decision errors can be modulated by drugs (Hester et al., 2012) and brain stimulation 
(Harty et al., 2014). Moreover, recent work has identified distinct neural substrates in the frontal and 
parietal lobes supporting metacognitive monitoring across a range of tasks (Fleming et al., 2010; 
McCurdy et al., 2013; Baird et al., 2013; Allen et al., 2016; Cortese et al., 2017; see Fleming & 
Dolan, 2012, for a review), suggesting the potential for targeted modulation of metacognition 
independently of changes in first-order performance. 
Previous attempts to improve metacognitive ability (confidence calibration) through explicit 
instruction, practice, feedback or a combination of these manipulations have led to mixed results, with 
some studies documenting increases, and others documenting null findings (e.g. Adams & Adams, 
1958; Lichtenstein et al. 1982; Sharp et al. 1988; Bol et al., 2005; Nietfeld & Schraw, 2002; Renner & 
Renner, 2001). One potential explanation for such heterogeneity of results is that training may impact 
first-order performance, thus masking subtle changes in metacognition because they are positively 
correlated (Fleming & Lau, 2014; Sharp et al. 1988). Recent developments in the analysis of 
confidence-rating data now permit the effective isolation of metacognitive ability (the relationship 
between performance and confidence) from changes in performance through calculation of the signal 
detection theoretic parameter meta-d’ (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; Fleming & Lau, 2014). Because 
meta-d’ is in the same units as first-order performance (d’) a metacognitive “efficiency” score (meta-
d’/d’) is straightforward to calculate and indexes an individual’s metacognitive capacity with respect 
to a particular level of task performance. While training paradigms have proven effective in other 
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cognitive domains, such as working memory (Klingberg, 2010; Morrison and Chein, 2011; von 
Bastian and Oberauer, 2014; Constantinidis and Klingberg, 2016) and even perceptual domains such 
as synaesthesia (Bor et al., 2014), it remains unknown whether metacognitive efficiency can be 
improved with practice, and whether putative metacognitive training supports transfer to untrained 
tasks or domains. Given that effective monitoring of performance is deemed important for effective 
behavioural control (Nelson & Narens, 1990; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008), intervening to improve 
metacognition may have widespread benefits, for example in educational and clinical settings. 
However, it remains unclear whether such an intervention is a priori plausible for alleviating 
metacognitive deficits, or enhancing baseline metacognitive performance, across a range of scenarios. 
There is disagreement about the extent to which metacognitive ability is a domain-general resource 
that can be applied to multiple different tasks, or whether it is comprised of domain-specific 
components. Recent findings suggest that confidence is encoded in a “common currency” that can be 
compared across a range of arbitrary decision scenarios (de Gardelle & Mamassian, 2014; Faivre et 
al., 2017). However other studies indicate a substantial fraction of individual variation in 
metacognitive ability is domain-specific (Kelemen et al., 2000; Morales et al., 2018), consistent with 
dissociable neural correlates of perceptual and memory metacognition (McCurdy et al., 2013; Baird et 
al., 2013; Fleming et al., 2014; Morales et al., 2018). To the extent to which metacognition is domain-
specific, training in one domain (for instance, on the computerized perceptual discrimination task that 
we employ here) may provide only narrow benefits to metacognition in that domain and be of limited 
value outside the laboratory. To evaluate the potential benefits of training on metacognitive ability it 
is therefore critical to assess whether such improvements generalize to an untrained task or cognitive 
domain. A useful parallel can be drawn with the literature on working memory training – here, meta-
analysis suggests that “near” transfer to closely related tasks is commonly obtained, but evidence for 
far transfer is less consistent (Melby-Lervag & Hulme, 2013). The transfer profile of metacognitive 
training remains unknown. 
Here we sought to investigate these questions by providing differential feedback to two 
groups of participants over eight training sessions on a perceptual discrimination task. A control group 
received feedback on their objective perceptual discrimination performance, whereas an experimental 
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group received feedback on the calibration of their metacognitive judgments with respect to objective 
performance. Despite both groups exhibiting similar task performance, the experimental group 
displayed selective enhancements of metacognitive calibration (the association between confidence 
and performance) on the trained task. Furthermore, we obtained evidence for a transfer of 
metacognitive enhancements to an untrained stimulus type and to an untrained task (recognition 
memory). Together our results reveal a hitherto unreported malleability of domain-general 
mechanisms supporting metacognition and highlight the potential for generalized improvements in 
metacognitive ability. 
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Methods 
In this section we report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions, all manipulations 
and all measures in the study (Simmons et al., 2012). 
Participants 
We set out to recruit at least 30 subjects per group (60 in total), and no data were analysed 
prior to completion of data collection. Data were collected via Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(https://www.mturk.com), an online crowdsourcing platform. 102 adult participants completed at least 
the first session of the study. Of these, 8 participants were excluded from further training due to floor 
or ceiling performance in the pre-training baseline session, and a further 25 participants exited the 
study before completing the full training protocol. Of the remaining 69 participants, one was excluded 
due to technical problems and 7 were excluded based on data quality criteria explained in detail 
below. Final analyses were carried out on a dataset of 61 participants (35 women, 26 men, mean age = 
38.1 years, age range: 20 – 64 years). Participants were required to use either Google Chrome or 
Mozilla Firefox in full-screen mode to complete the experiment on a computer(s) of their choosing.  
Before participating in each session, all subjects provided informed consent as approved by 
the UCLA Institutional Review Board (IRB#15-001476). Subjects received monetary compensation 
in U.S. Dollars (range = $37.60 - $44.60) for approximately 5 hours (mean = 5.33 hours) of 
participation over a period of 9-35 days (Control group mean = 15.5 days, Experimental group mean 
= 15.4 days; independent samples t-test t(59) = 0.10, p = 0.92). 
 
Overview of procedure 
The experiment was divided into 3 phases: Phase 1, pre-training (1 session) → Phase 2, 
training (8 sessions) → Phase 3, post-training (1 session), resulting in 10 sessions in total. Figure 1B 
provides an overview of the experiment timeline. Phase 1 consisted of stimulus titration and a pre-
training session to evaluate baseline metacognitive accuracy in a series of 2-alternative forced-choice 
(2AFC) discrimination tasks (see Task below and Figure 1A). One set of tasks assessed perceptual 
discrimination, the other set assessed recognition memory. The tasks followed a 2×2 factorial design 
crossing cognitive domain (perception or memory) with stimulus type (explained in detail below). 
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Each task consisted of 108 trials, giving 432 total trials in the pre-training session. The order of these 
tasks was counterbalanced such that each participant performed both tasks in one domain followed by 
both tasks in the other domain, and within each domain the order of stimulus types was also 
counterbalanced. 
At the start of Phase 2 subjects were assigned to one of four groups. Each group formed a cell 
in a 2×2 factorial design crossing feedback type (Control group vs. Experimental group) and trained 
stimulus type (see Training Procedure below). All subjects received training on the perceptual task 
only, with the recognition memory task introduced again at post-training to assess transfer to a 
different task domain. During the training phase, each of the eight sessions consisted of 270 trials 
(2160 trials total), and block-wise feedback was administered every 27 trials (see Feedback below).  
Phase 3, the final post-training session, was identical to the pre-training session Phase 1 
except that stimulus titration was omitted. Task order was counterbalanced against that used in pre-
training, such that each subject performed the task domains (memory, perception) in the opposite 
order to that seen in pre-training. The order of stimulus types within each domain remained the same. 
Phase 1 lasted approximately 60 minutes, the eight training sessions in Phase 2 lasted 
approximately 25 minutes each, and Phase 3 lasted approximately 45 minutes. Subjects were required 
to wait a minimum of 24 hours between each session and were asked via email to complete each 
subsequent session within 48-72 hours of the previous session.  
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Figure 1. Task and session structure. A) Subjects were tested on both a perceptual discrimination 
and recognition memory task, each involving two stimulus types: abstract shapes and words. The 
perceptual task (left) comprised a 2-alternative forced-choice discrimination judgment as to the 
brighter of two simultaneously presented stimuli on each trial. The memory task (right) comprised an 
encoding phase followed by a series of 2-alternative forced-choice recognition memory judgments. B) 
Experiment timeline. Each subject completed 10 sessions in total: a pre-training session, 8 training 
sessions, and a post-training session. All four conditions were assessed at pre- and post-training, but 
only the perceptual task with a single stimulus type (shapes or words) was trained during sessions 2-
9. During training sessions, the control groups received feedback on their objective perceptual 
discrimination performance, whereas the experimental groups received feedback on their 
metacognitive calibration. In both groups, feedback was delivered every 27 trials (see Methods).  
 
Tasks 
Figure 1A displays example trial timelines for the perception and memory tasks. In the 
perception task, participants were presented with two images (either ‘words’ or ‘shapes’) and asked to 
judge “which [image] has brighter lines?” In the memory task, participants were first presented with a 
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series of images to memorize (again either ‘words’ or ‘shapes’). On each subsequent trial, one old 
image and one novel image were presented with the instruction to judge “which [image] have you 
seen before”. In all tasks, after each decision, subjects were asked to rate their confidence on a 1-4 
scale. They were informed that 1 corresponds to “very low confidence”, 2 to “low confidence”, 3 to 
“high confidence” and 4 to “very high confidence”.  
In the pre-training session, before beginning each task, subjects completed 3 practice trials to 
become acquainted with making perception/memory judgments and using the confidence rating scale. 
Following the practice trials, we probed knowledge of how to perform the perception/memory 
judgments with a comprehension question asking “In the perception/memory task, how do you decide 
which image to choose?” The three response options were “which one you remember”, “which has 
more lines”, and “which is brighter”. If a participant answered either question incorrectly, they were 
excluded from further participation and offered a partial reimbursement determined by the proportion 
of the session completed. There were no practice trials or comprehension questions in the post-
training session.  
 
Training Procedure 
The second phase of the study involved eight training sessions of 270 trials each (2160 trials 
in total), spread over 8-34 days. Participants were randomly allocated to one of four groups in a 2×2 
factorial design crossing feedback type (Control group vs. Experimental group) and trained stimulus 
type (shapes or words). All groups received block-wise feedback in the form of reward (points) every 
27 trials. The Control groups (for both stimulus types) received feedback on their objective perceptual 
discrimination performance; the Experimental groups (for both stimulus types) received feedback on 
their metacognitive calibration, as determined by the average Quadratic Scoring Rule (QSR) score. 
The QSR provides a metric for how closely confidence ratings track accuracy (Staël von Holstein, 
1970), and is equal to one minus the Brier score (Fleming & Lau, 2014). The rule underpinning each 
feedback type is described in more detail under Feedback below. 
To ensure that each group fully understood how points could be earned, instructions were 
provided on the meaning of the feedback schedule. Participants completed eight demonstration trials 
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which explained how earnings changed based on their objective performance (Control group) or the 
correspondence between confidence and accuracy (Experimental group). After the demonstration, 
subjects performed ten practice trials in which they received full feedback and a brief explanation. 
Note that in the demonstration and practice trials, feedback was calculated on a trial-by-trial basis and 
therefore differed from the block-wise feedback received in the training sessions (see Feedback). 
After the demonstration and practice trials, participants were asked two comprehension questions 
probing their understanding of how to earn points. If they failed these questions they were asked to 
attempt them again until they were successful.   
 
Task Performance Titration 
Throughout the entire 10-session experiment, the performance of each subject was titrated 
online to achieve approximately 75% correct for all tasks except the memory-words task. This 
“threshold” level of percentage correct produces sufficient trials for each Signal Detection Theory 
outcome (hits, misses, false alarms and correct rejections) for analysis of d’ and meta-d’ (Maniscalco 
and Lau, 2012), and ensured any changes in metacognitive sensitivity were not confounded by shifts 
in task performance.  
Titration was accomplished in different ways for each task. In the perception tasks (for both 
word and shapes), we implemented two interleaved, weighted and transformed staircase procedures 
on the brightness of the images. We alternated two staircases with differently weighted step sizes. In 
the first staircase, after two consecutive correct responses the stimulus brightness was decreased by 2 
steps; after 1 incorrect response the brightness was increased by 4 steps. In the second staircase, after 
3 correct responses the brightness level was decreased by 3 steps, after 1 incorrect response the 
brightness was increased by 4 steps. Note that these are not traditional N-down/1-up procedures as the 
correct trial counter was not reset to zero after each pair or triplet of correct responses. However, we 
found in pilot work that this interleaved method stably converges to 75% correct. Brightness levels 
were adjusted independently for word and shape stimuli. In order to define initial brightness levels, 
subjects performed a 60-trial titration block for each stimulus type after the practice trials and before 
beginning the pre-training session. The final brightness level at the end of the titration block acted as 
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the initial brightness level for pre-training session 1. Each subsequent session 2-10 began with the 
final brightness level of the previous session. 
In the memory-shapes task, the number of stimuli in the encoding period was adjusted based 
on the average percentage correct recorded over the previous two blocks. If average performance 
exceeded 75% correct, one additional image was added to the encoding set. If performance dropped 
below 70% correct, one image was removed, down to a minimum of 2 images. We initialised the 
encoding set size at 4 images. Note that even though the minimum set size was 2, the underlying 
staircase value had no minimum value.  
For the memory-words task, we employed a fixed set size of 54 words. This larger set size 
was based on initial pilot data and the procedure of McCurdy et al. (2013), and reflects the fact that 
subjects typically find encoding and remembering individual words significantly easier than encoding 
and remembering abstract shapes. 
 
Feedback 
Feedback in the form of points was given based on task performance in the Control group and 
metacognitive calibration in the Experimental group. We rewarded the Control group on their 
achieved difficulty level, specified as the inverse distance between the current brightness level and the 
minimum brightness of 128:  difficulty = 	128	–	(brightness	– 	128) 
where brightness level 𝜖	[128 − 256] 	→ difficulty level 𝜖	[0 − 128]. We chose difficulty 
level instead of accuracy as the relevant performance measure because accuracy was titrated to ~75% 
correct in each block.  
We rewarded the Experimental group using the Quadratic Scoring Rule (QSR). The QSR is a 
proper scoring rule in the formal sense that maximum points are obtained by jointly maximizing the 
accuracy of choices and confidence ratings (Stael von Holstein, 1970). We mapped each confidence 
rating onto a subjective probability correct using a linear transformation: 𝑝(𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡) 	= 	−1/3	 +	conf/3, where confidence rating 𝜖	[1 − 4] 	→ 	𝑝(𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡)	𝜖	[0 − 1]. On each trial i the QSR score is 
then obtained as:  
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𝑄𝑆𝑅O 	= 	1	–	(𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦O 	− 	𝑝(𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡)O)S 
where accuracy 𝜖	[0,1] and 𝑝(𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡)	𝜖	[0 − 1] 	→ 	𝑄𝑆𝑅	𝜖	[0 − 1]. This rule ensures that 
people receive the highest number of points when they are highly confident and right, or unconfident 
and wrong (i.e. metacognitively accurate).  
Despite feedback in each group being based on different variables, we endeavoured to equate 
the distribution of points across groups. We used data from an initial pilot study (without feedback) to 
obtain distributions of expected difficulty level and QSR scores. We then calculated the average 
difficulty level/QSR score for each block, and fit Gaussian cumulative density functions (CDFs) to 
these distributions of scores. These CDFs were then used to transform a given difficulty or QSR score 
in the main experiment to a given number of points.  
 
Compensation 
Participants were compensated at approximately $4 per hour, plus a possible bonus on each 
session. Base pay for the 60-minute pre-training session was $4, for the eight 25-minute training 
sessions $2 each, and for the 45-minute post-training session $3. Participants were informed they had 
the opportunity to earn a session bonus if they outperformed a randomly chosen other subject on that 
session. In practice, bonuses were distributed pseudo-randomly to ensure equivalent financial 
motivation irrespective of performance. All subjects received in the range of 4-7 bonuses throughout 
the course of the 10-session study. Bonuses comprised an additional 70% of the base payment 
received on any given session.  
In addition to the pseudo-random bonuses, all subjects received a $3 bonus for completing 
half (5) of the sessions and a $6 bonus for completing all (10) of the sessions. Total earnings ranged 
from $37.60 – $43.90 across participants, and income did not differ significantly between groups 
(Control group: mean = $41.47; Experimental group: mean = $40.98; t(59) = 0.94, p = 0.35). The base 
payment was paid immediately after completing each session and accumulated bonuses were paid 
only if the participant completed the full 10 session experiment.   
 
Quantifying metacognition 
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Our summary measure of metacognitive calibration was the QSR score achieved by subjects 
before and after training. In order to separately assess effects of training on metacognitive bias (i.e. 
confidence level) and efficiency (i.e. the degree to which confidence discriminates between correct 
and incorrect trials), we also fitted meta-d’ to the confidence rating data. The meta-d’ model provides 
a bias-free method for evaluating metacognitive efficiency in a signal detection theory framework. 
Specifically, the ratio meta-d’/d’ quantifies the degree to which confidence ratings discriminate 
between correct and incorrect trials while controlling for first-order performance (d’). Using this ratio 
as a measure of metacognition effectively eliminates performance and response bias confounds 
typically affecting other measures (Barrett et al., 2013; Fleming & Lau, 2014). We conducted 
statistical analyses on log(meta-d’/d’) as a logarithmic scale is appropriate for a ratio measure, giving 
equal weight to increases and decreases relative to the optimal value of meta-d’/d’ = 1. 
Meta-d’ was fit to each subject’s confidence rating data on a per-session basis using 
maximum likelihood estimation as implemented in freely available MATLAB code 
(http://www.columbia.edu/~bsm2105/type2sdt/). Metacognitive bias was assessed as the average 
confidence level across a particular task and session, irrespective of correctness.   
 
Outline of analysis plan 
 By employing a combination of frequentist and Bayesian statistics, we aimed to assess the 
differential impact of the training manipulation across groups and the transfer of training effects 
across domains. In order to model the dynamics of training, we additionally assessed the drivers of the 
training effect using latent change score modeling and mediation analysis.  
We first applied mixed-effects ANOVAs to measures of metacognition including “group” as 
a between-subjects factor and “task domain” as a within-subjects factor. Complementary to classical 
ANOVAs, we also employed a Bayesian “analysis of effects” which quantifies evidence in support of 
transfer of training effects across stimulus types and domains. Evidence in support of transfer is 
indicated by a simpler model, without stimulus or domain interaction terms, providing a better fit to 
the data. Finally, by modeling our data using latent changes scores, we gained insight into whether 
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effects of training are dependent on baseline metacognitive abilities. In addition, we used mediation 
modelling to ask whether early shifts in confidence strategy facilitated later improvements in 
introspective ability. 
 
Analysis of effects of training 
In addition to the pre-training exclusion criteria detailed above, the following set of pre-
defined exclusion criteria was applied after data collection was complete. One subject was excluded 
for performing outside the range of 55 – 95% correct in at least one condition/session. One subject 
was excluded due to their average difficulty level calculated across all sessions dropping below 2.5 
standard deviations below the group mean difficulty level. Five subjects were excluded for reporting 
the same confidence level on 95% of trials for 3 or more sessions. Finally, trials in which either the 
subject did not respond in time (response times > 2000ms) or response times were less than 200ms 
were omitted from further analysis (0.98% of all trials). 
To evaluate effects of training, we compared data from the pre- and post-training sessions 
using mixed-model ANOVAs in JASP (https://jasp-stats.org/) to assess the presence of training 
effects as a function of domain and stimulus type (factors: [Training × Domain × Stimulus] × 
Group). We coded the “Stimulus” factor in terms of whether the stimulus encountered during the pre- 
and post-training sessions was trained or untrained. We also employed a Bayesian “analysis of 
effects” in JASP to quantify evidence for and against across-stimulus and across-domain transfer of 
training effects on confidence and metacognitive efficiency (Rouder et al., 2012). 
 
Latent change modeling 
To assess the dependence of training gains in the (trained) perceptual domain and the 
(untrained) memory domain on baseline metacognitive abilities, we fit a bivariate latent change score 
(LCS) model to QSR scores (Kievit et al., 2017; McArdle & Nesselroade, 1994). LCS models 
conceptualize differences between pre- and post-training performance as latent change factors. The 
basic equation of the LCS model specifies the score of individual i in domain Y at post-training as a 
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sum of the score at pre-training and a change, or difference, score: 𝑌O,VWXY = 𝛽O,V[\𝑌O,V[\ + 𝛥𝑌O 
By setting the regression weight 𝛽O,V[\ to 1, change scores can be rewritten as follows: 𝛥𝑌O = 𝑌O,VWXY − 𝑌O,V[\  
This formulation allows the change score for memory or perceptual metacognitive calibration (e.g. 𝛥𝑀	or 𝛥𝑃) itself to be modelled as being dependent on two influences, a self-feedback process 𝛽 and 
a coupling process 𝛾: 𝛥𝑀O = 𝛽a𝑀O,V[\ + 𝛾a𝑃O,V[\  𝛥𝑃O = 𝛽b𝑃O,V[\ + 𝛾b𝑀O,V[\  
where P and M denote the QSR scores for the perceptual and memory domains, respectively. To 
simplify the model we included only data from the trained stimulus type in both domains. The self-
feedback parameters (𝛽) are assumed to reflect a combination of regression to the mean, potential 
dependence of training on baseline performance (e.g. the extent to which training gains are greater for 
individuals with low/high baseline calibration) and/or ceiling effects. The coupling parameters (𝛾) 
assess the extent to which change in one domain is dependent upon baseline calibration in the other 
domain, above and beyond the effects of self-feedback. The bivariate LCS formulation also allows 
estimation of the extent of correlated change, reflecting the degree to which training effects co-occur 
across domains, having taken into account the coupling and self-feedback parameters. 
 Models were estimated in the lavaan package for R (Version 5.23; Rosseel, 2012) using full 
information maximum likelihood, robust (Huber-White) standard errors and a scaled test statistic. We 
assessed overall model fit via the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA; acceptable fit: < 
0.08, good fit: < 0.05), the comparative fit index (CFI; acceptable fit: 0.95-0.97, good fit: > 0.97) and 
the standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR; acceptable fit: 0.05-0.10, good fit: < 0.05; 
Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger & Muller, 2003). 
 
Analysis of training dynamics 
In order to investigate the dynamics of the training effect we calculated objective 
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performance, metacognitive bias and metacognitive efficiency separately for each of the eight training 
sessions. This allowed us to visualise any progressive effects of feedback on metacognition while also 
establishing the stability of task performance during training sessions.  To assess whether shifts in 
metacognitive bias mediate the impact of training on metacognitive efficiency, we fit mediation 
models using the Mediation Toolbox for MATLAB (https://github.com/canlab/MediationToolbox). 
The Mediation Toolbox uses nonparametric bootstrapping, which is more robust in handling 
violations to normality than traditional parametric approaches such as the Sobel test. 
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Results 
To quantify effects of training on both performance and metacognition, we conducted mixed-
model ANOVAs comparing pre- and post-training sessions (factors: [Training × Domain × Stimulus] × Group). We coded the “Stimulus” factor in terms of whether the stimulus encountered during pre- 
and post-training was trained or untrained.  
First-order performance 
Task performance (d’) was stable across pre- and post-training sessions in both groups (main 
effect of training: F1,59 = 0.34, P = 0.56), and both groups performed similarly (main effect of group: 
F1,59 = 0.15, P = 0.71), as expected from the staircase procedure (Figure 2). When examining task 
difficulty (brightness level, controlled by the staircase procedure), we found that both groups achieved 
a higher difficulty level (lower brightness level) following training (main effect of training: F1,59 = 
15.2, P < 0.001), with a trend towards a more prominent difference in the Control group who received 
feedback on this quantity (trainingcontrol: F1,31 = 16.46, P < 0.001; trainingexperimental: F1,28 = 2.23, P = 
0.15; training × group: F1,59 = 3.14, P = 0.081; Figure S1). 
 
 
Figure 2. First-order discrimination performance. Effect of training on first-order performance (d’) 
in the control group (who received feedback on perceptual discrimination performance) and the 
experimental group (who received feedback on their metacognitive judgments) as a function of 
Pre 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Post
Session
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
d'
Control Group
P, trained stimulus
P, untrained stimulus
M, trained stimulus
M, untrained stimulus
Pre 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Post
Session
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
Experimental Group
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whether the judgment was made on a perception (red) or memory (blue) trial, and on the trained 
(filled) or untrained (unfilled) stimulus type. Error bars represent between-subjects SEM. 
P=perception; M=memory. 
Metacognitive calibration 
To quantify metacognitive calibration before and after training we examined the average 
score achieved from the quadratic scoring rule (QSR). QSR scores are highest when confidence 
matches accuracy on a trial-by-trial basis – i.e. when subjects report higher confidence after correct 
trials, and lower confidence after errors. Critically, we observed a significant training × group 
interaction (F1,59 = 38.07, P < 0.001), driven by a robust increase in calibration in the Experimental 
group (F1,28 = 25.55, P < 0.001) and a decrease in the Control group (F1,31 = 13.15, P = 0.001; Figure 
3 and Figure S2).  
Having revealed a selective improvement in metacognitive calibration in the Experimental 
group, we next asked whether this improvement generalised across stimulus types or domains. To 
quantify the evidence for and against across-stimulus and across-domain transfer, we performed 
Bayesian ANOVAs (Table 1) on QSR scores in the Experimental group. This approach (known as an 
“analysis of effects”; Rouder et al., 2012) analyzes all possible models of the data (e.g. main effects 
only, main effects + interaction effect, etc.). For each effect, a Bayes factor quantifies the degree to 
which the data support models including versus excluding that effect. We found evidence in support 
of modeling a main effect of training (BFinclusion = 1.1 × 1010), and evidence against modeling training × stimulus (BFinclusion = 0.13) and training × domain (BFinclusion = 0.10) interactions (Table 1, left 
columns). In other words, the best-fitting model is one in which the training effect on QSR scores was 
similar for both stimulus types (shapes and words) and both task domains (perception and memory), 
supporting both transfer to the untrained stimulus (within the trained perceptual task) and transfer to 
the recognition memory task, for both stimulus types. Together these results show that our 
metacognitive feedback protocol was able to selectively improve the correspondence between 
confidence and accuracy when feedback was removed, and that this improvement in confidence 
estimation transferred both to an untrained stimulus type and an untrained task (recognition memory). 
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Figure 3. Metacognitive calibration. Effect of training on confidence calibration (the average 
quadratic scoring rule score, QSR). Calibration improved over training sessions in the Experimental 
group in the absence of changes in first-order performance (Figure 2), and this improvement 
transferred both to an untrained stimulus and untrained recognition memory task. Error bars 
represent between-subjects SEM; P=perception, M=memory. 
 
Metacognitive efficiency and bias 
 
Recent approaches distinguish between two key aspects of metacognitive performance 
(Fleming & Lau, 2014). The first is efficiency - how accurately do subjects discriminate between 
correct and incorrect trials for a given level of first-order task performance? The second is bias - are 
subjects generally more or less confident in a particular task or condition? Using a signal detection 
theory approach, we sought to reveal whether metacognitive improvements due to training were due 
to changes in efficiency, bias or both. The ratio meta-d’/d’ quantifies the efficiency with which 
confidence ratings discriminate between correct and incorrect trials while controlling for first-order 
performance (d’) (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). Bias was assessed as the average confidence level 
irrespective of whether a trial was correct or incorrect. 
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Figure 4. Effects of training on components of metacognition. Effects of training on metacognitive 
bias (confidence level; top panels) and metacognitive efficiency (log(meta-d’/d’); bottom panels). The 
left-hand column shows data from the Control group; the right-hand column shows data from the 
Experimental group. Metacognitive efficiency (log(meta-d’/d’)) gradually improved over training in 
the experimental group (bottom panel) in the absence of changes in first-order performance (Figure 
2). Error bars represent between-subjects SEM; P=perception, M=memory. One subject was 
excluded when plotting mean log(meta-d’/d’) for session 6 due to a negative value of meta-d’ 
precluding a log-transform. 
When analyzing metacognitive efficiency [log(meta-d’/d’)] we observed a significant training × group interaction (F1,59 = 6.96, P = 0.011), driven by a selective increase from pre- to post-training 
in the Experimental group (trainingexperimental: F1,28 = 6.72, P = 0.015; trainingcontrol: F1,31 = 1.39, P = 
0.25; bottom row of Figure 4). Improvements in metacognitive efficiency were also accompanied by 
an overall increase in metacognitive bias (confidence level) (trainingexperimental: F1,28 = 73.87, P < 
0.001; trainingcontrol: F1,31 = 3.77, P = 0.061; training × group: F1,59 = 49.35, P < 0.001; top row of 
Figure 4).   
In a Bayesian analysis of effects, we found positive evidence against the inclusion of a 
training × stimulus interaction term for both metacognitive bias and metacognitive efficiency (Table 
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1, middle and righthand columns). In other words, the best-fitting model was one in which the training 
effect was similar for both stimulus types, supporting the existence of transfer to the untrained 
stimulus. However, there was equivocal evidence for or against transfer across domains (the training × domain interaction term) for both metacognitive bias and metacognitive efficiency, suggesting our 
data cannot support or refute domain-general training effects when examining these components 
separately. 
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Analysis of Effects  Calibration 
(QSR) 
 
 
Metacognitive bias 
(confidence level) 
 
 
Metacognitive efficiency 
[𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝐦𝐞𝐭𝐚 − 𝒅k/𝒅′)] 
Effects 
Training 
 Bayes Factor Inclusion 
1.09e+10 
Evidence 
Very Strong For 
 Bayes Factor Inclusion 
∞ 
Evidence 
Very Strong For 
 Bayes Factor Inclusion 
5.55 
Evidence 
Positive For 
Domain  0.08 Positive Against  0.46 Insubstantial  2348.77 Very Strong For 
Stimulus  0.09 Positive Against  0.08 Positive Against  0.20 Positive Against 
Training  ×  Domain  0.10 Positive Against  0.59 Insubstantial  1.18 Insubstantial 
Training  ×  Stimulus  0.13 Positive Against  0.09 Positive Against  0.13 Positive Against 
Domain  ×  Stimulus  0.01 Strong Against  0.04 Strong Against  0.46 Insubstantial 
Training  ×  Domain  × 
 Stimulus 
 3.66e-4 Very Strong 
Against 
 4.55 e-4 Very Strong 
Against 
 0.07 Positive Against 
 
Table 1. Bayesian ANOVA Analysis of Effects. Evidence in support of including different 
explanatory variables in models of metacognitive calibration (QSR score; left columns), 
metacognitive bias (confidence level; middle columns) and metacognitive efficiency (log(meta-d’/d’); 
right columns) in the experimental group. We obtained positive evidence against inclusion of a 
training × stimulus interaction term for all measures, indicating the best-fitting model is one in which 
the training effect is similar for both stimulus types. There was positive evidence against inclusion of 
a training × domain interaction term (indicating transfer across domains) in models of calibration 
(QSR score), and equivocal evidence for or against this term in models of both metacognitive bias and 
metacognitive efficiency. Strength of evidence is evaluated using Kass and Raftery’s (1995) 
interpretation of the Bayes Factor. 
 
Latent change modeling 
To identify potential drivers of improvements in metacognitive calibration we fit bivariate 
latent change score (BLCS) models to the QSR score data. Specifically, we examined the inter-
relationship between changes in calibration for perception and memory from pre-training (T1) to post-
training (T2; restricted to scores obtained for the trained stimulus type). We assessed the evidence for 
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five possible parameters in the model. First, does baseline perceptual metacognitive ability predict the 
degree of change in perceptual calibration (self-feedback parameter) and/or memory calibration 
(coupling parameter)? Similarly, does baseline memory calibration predict the degree of change in 
memory calibration (self-feedback parameter) and/or perceptual calibration (coupling parameter)? 
Finally, is there evidence for correlated improvements (covariance of change) in perceptual and 
memory calibration across individuals?  
Before fitting the bivariate model, we first fitted two univariate LCS models to each domain 
separately. In these models, the mean and variance of pre-training scores was constrained to be equal 
between the Experimental and Control groups. The memory model fitted the data well: χ2(2) = 0.72, P 
= 0.70; RMSEA < 0.001, 90% confidence interval [0.000, 0.265]; CFI = 1.000; SRMR = 0.083. The 
equivalent perceptual model revealed a poor model fit (χ2(2) = 2.43, P = 0.30; RMSEA = 0.084, 90% 
confidence interval [0.000, 0.380]; CFI = 0.91; SRMR = 0.132), which further examination indicated 
was driven by a higher variance of pre-training QSR scores in the Experimental compared to the 
Control group. Allowing the variance of T1 scores to differ between groups restored good model fit: 
χ2(1)= 0.62, P= 0.43; RMSEA < 0.001, 90% confidence interval [0.000, 0.439]; CFI = 1.000; SRMR 
= 0.046. We thus allowed perceptual T1 variance to differ between groups in the bivariate LCS model 
considered below. As expected, both univariate models showed evidence for positive change in QSR 
scores for the Experimental group (unstandardized change score intercepts – perception: 0.80, SE = 
0.067, z = 11.9; memory: 0.64, SE = 0.086, z = 7.50) but not the Control group (perception: 0.19, SE 
= 0.17, z = 1.10; memory: 0.089, SE = 0.10, z = 0.87)1. 
We next tested for inter-relationships between perception and memory calibration in a 
bivariate LCS model (shown graphically in Figure 5; significant paths are shown as thicker lines). The 
bivariate LCS model showed good model fit: χ2(4) = 3.20, P = 0.53; RMSEA < 0.001, 90% 
confidence interval [0.000, 0.247]; CFI = 1.000; SRMR = 0.071. Fitted model parameters are shown 
separately for the Control and Experimental groups in Figure 5. In addition to the expected significant 
                                                             
1 Note that these intercept parameters can be interpreted only in the context of the full LCS model that 
includes the self-feedback pathway. 
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latent change intercepts in the Experimental group (i.e. increasing scores), the self-feedback 
parameters were also positive in the Experimental group for both perception and memory, indicating 
that greater gains in response to training were found in individuals who started off with low 
metacognitive ability. Notably self-feedback effects were not observed in the Control group, 
indicating that this pattern of results is unlikely to be due to regression to the mean or repeated testing 
(constraining coupling and self-feedback parameters to be equal across groups led to a significantly 
worse model fit; 𝛥𝜒S(4) = 	21.16, 𝑃 < 0.001). The coupling parameter from perception at T1 to 
memory at T2 was also negative – individuals who started out lower in perceptual calibration 
improved more on memory calibration, over and above any effect of the self-feedback parameters. 
Finally, there was no evidence for correlated change between domains in the Experimental group. 
Together this analysis indicates that effects of metacognitive training depend on baseline 
metacognitive abilities, both within and across domains. 
 
Figure 5. Estimated parameters for the bivariate latent change score model of metacognitive 
calibration (QSR scores). Calibration scores were modeled pre- (T1) and post- (T2) training across 
both domains, restricted to the trained stimulus type. Unstandardized parameter estimates are given 
separately for each group (with standard errors in parentheses). Solid lines indicate parameter 
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significance at P < 0.05. Note that the T1 covariance, T1 intercepts and T1 memory variance were 
constrained to be equal across groups. T1 perception variance was estimated separately for each 
group as explained in the text. Per = perception; Mem = memory; T1 = pre-training; T2 = post-
training. 
Dynamics of metacognitive bias and efficiency  
Figure 4 indicates that a shift in metacognitive bias (confidence level) in the experimental 
group occurred immediately on the first training session (see also Figure S3), whereas metacognitive 
efficiency (meta-d’/d’) increased more gradually over the eight training sessions. To further quantify 
differences in these timecourses we calculated the session-to-session change in confidence and 
metacognitive efficiency (Figure 6A). The peak change in confidence was reliably earlier than the 
peak change in efficiency (Figure 6B; t(28) = 3.67, P = 0.001). To assess whether early changes in 
confidence were associated with later shifts in metacognitive efficiency, we fit a mediation model 
(Figure 6C). Consistent with such a hypothesis, the impact of feedback type (i.e. group) on increases 
in log(meta-d’/d’) was positively mediated by initial shifts in confidence (t(58) = 2.24, P = 0.028). 
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Figure 6. Temporal dissociation of shifts in metacognitive bias and metacognitive efficiency. (A) 
Rate of change over sessions of confidence level and meta-d’/d’ in the experimental group showing an 
early shift towards responding with higher confidence (see also Figure S3). This shift in confidence 
was dissociated in time from a more gradual improvement in metacognitive efficiency, with the 
largest changes occurring towards the end of training. (B) The session at which this peak shift 
occurred was significantly earlier for metacognitive bias (confidence level) compared to 
metacognitive efficiency (meta-d’/d’). (C) Early increases in confidence mediate the impact of 
feedback type on later increases in metacognitive efficiency. Values outside of parentheses indicate 
the coefficient mean and values inside parentheses indicate the SEM. 
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Discussion 
Here we reveal a domain-general enhancement of metacognitive abilities despite objective 
performance (d’) remaining unchanged across two distinct perceptual and memory tasks. These 
changes were only observed when feedback was targeted to metacognitive judgments – an active 
control group who performed the same tasks but received feedback on first-order (objective) 
performance did not show the same improvement. Since feedback and financial incentives were 
matched across groups, motivational factors are unlikely to account for our results. Our findings are 
instead consistent with a specific effect of metacognitive feedback in enhancing subjects’ ability to 
introspect about self-performance.   
In addition to a main effect of training on a trained stimulus type, we obtained evidence that 
improvements in calibration scores generalized both to other instances of brightness discrimination 
and, more importantly, an untrained task (recognition memory). This result indicates that the feedback 
individuals receive on their confidence-accuracy relationship on one task can lead to improved 
confidence calibration for unrelated tasks, after feedback is removed. Current evidence for a shared 
neurocognitive resource for metacognition is ambiguous, partly due to a difficulty of distilling 
metacognitive processes from those supporting primary task performance (Ais et al., 2016; Baird et 
al., 2013; Song et al., 2011; McCurdy et al., 2013). The observation of domain-general enhancement 
provides a novel perspective on this issue, suggesting the existence of generic metacognitive 
resources that can be altered through training. Previous work has suggested confidence estimates are 
compared in a “common currency” across a range of decision scenarios (de Gardelle & Mamassian, 
2014; Faivre et al., 2017), and training may boost the fidelity of such shared signals. In turn our 
findings hold promise for the future development of training protocols to boost metacognition in 
applied settings, in which administering domain-specific adaptive training protocols may facilitate 
improvements in metacognitive abilities more generally. 
Latent change score modeling of QSR scores indicated that baseline performance in both 
trained and untrained tasks (perception and memory) predicted the extent of training gains, with lower 
baseline levels in a particular domain predicting greater training gains in that domain. In addition, 
there was evidence for a cross-domain coupling in which lower initial scores on the trained 
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(perceptual) task predicted greater gains in the untrained memory task, over and above effects of self-
feedback. These effects were not observed in the active control group, making explanations of such 
dynamics in terms of regression to the mean or repeated practice less likely. Interestingly a similar 
pattern has been observed in the literature on working memory training, with the largest training gains 
observed for those initially low in WM capacity (Zinke et al., 2012; 2014; although see Bissig & 
Lustig, 2007). Such findings are potentially consistent with initially low performing individuals 
having a larger (underused) latent potential for WM/metacognition, therefore leading to a stronger 
response to training. A less interesting explanation is that there are ceiling effects on potential QSR 
scores, leading to a natural slowdown in gains as a function of starting point. Future work (for 
instance examining the effects of training over multiple time points, and/or with larger N to more 
precisely estimate the dynamics and cover a wider range of ability levels) is needed to disentangle 
these possibilities. 
We also examined how two key components of metacognition – metacognitive efficiency 
(meta-d’/d’) and metacognitive bias (confidence level) – evolved over the course of training. For both 
components, we observed significant effects of training in the experimental group. However, when 
examining transfer for each component individually, the picture was more mixed than for the 
composite calibration measure: while both components generalised to other instances of brightness 
discrimination, there was equivocal evidence for across-domain transfer to memory metacognition. 
This pattern of results is potentially consistent with a domain-specificity of metacognitive efficiency 
for perception vs. memory (McCurdy et al., 2013; Baird et al., 2013; Fleming et al., 2014), and recent 
observations that metacognitive efficiency, while stable within a particular subject across sessions, 
may be idiosyncratic to particular tasks (Ais et al., 2016). However, we note initial metacognitive 
efficiency scores for the memory task were high, potentially leading to a ceiling effect on subsequent 
improvement in this domain. In addition, it remains to be determined whether enhancements of 
perceptual metacognitive efficiency are limited in transfer to other features within the same modality 
(such as visual contrast and orientation; Song et al., 2011) or also generalise to other perceptual 
modalities, such as audition (Faivre et al., 2017). 
The timecourse of training effects provides insight into potential mechanisms supporting 
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metacognitive improvement. While confidence levels increased during the very first training session 
and remained stable throughout the remainder of the experiment, metacognitive efficiency climbed 
more gradually across the eight training sessions. One possible account of this pattern (supported by a 
mediation analysis) is that an initial shift in confidence strategy facilitates later increases in 
metacognitive efficiency allowing, for instance, higher confidence to be effectively targeted to correct 
trials (Figure S2). An implicit signal of whether a first-order decision is likely to be correct may then 
gradually become associated with higher confidence reports over time, and reinforced by the feedback 
schedule.  
It is important to note that an initial shift in confidence bias does not necessarily reflect a 
change in metacognition, and may instead reflect a strategic shift in response to the onset of feedback 
protocol and instructions. Critically, however, such a strategic shift alone is unlikely to explain later 
change in metacognitive efficiency. To establish the expected impact of a non-specific bias on 
measures of metacognitive efficiency, we conducted numerical simulations in which the pre-training 
confidence data were shifted to create an artificial bias in confidence level (Figure S6). These 
simulations show that “learning” to increase mean confidence leads to an increase in calibration score, 
as expected, but is insufficient to produce the observed increases in metacognitive efficiency. Indeed, 
when confidence bias is artificially induced, metacognitive efficiency is expected to be lower post- 
compared to pre-training – precisely the opposite of what we find. Thus we believe that these 
simulations lend support to a conclusion that metacognitive efficiency is specifically increased 
following feedback on metacognitive judgments, and this effect is not a trivial consequence of 
strategic biases in confidence. 
Our work goes significantly beyond previous attempts to improve the resolution or calibration 
of confidence judgments. Adams and Adams (1958), Lichtenstein et al. (1982), and Sharp et al. 
(1988) all reported changes in the confidence-accuracy relationship for participants who received 
feedback on the correctness of their confidence ratings but lacked active control groups or controls for 
changes in performance (although Sharp et al., 1988, were aware of this issue). Indeed, participants in 
the feedback condition of Adams & Adams (1958) reported feeling markedly more enthusiastic about 
the experiment, suggesting motivation differences may have confounded effects of feedback. Here we 
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addressed this concern by matching feedback schedules and first-order performance levels between 
the experimental group and an active control group, who received equivalent feedback directed at 
first-order performance. Intriguingly, the feedback protocol implemented in the present study may 
represent one among many possible methods for inducing increases in metacognitive efficiency. Other 
feedback protocols may operate via a different mechanism, e.g. learning to decrease error trial 
confidence, rather than increasing one’s confidence in being correct. Future work could investigate 
the scope of possible training protocols by manipulating parameters such as titrated performance level 
and feedback schedule. 
Fine-grained introspective ability is useful for several reasons. First, it aids the control of task 
performance – becoming aware of making suboptimal choices is a useful signal for prompting 
changes of mind (Folke et al., 2017) and for the guidance of learning (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008; 
Nietfeld & Schraw, 2002; Purcell & Kiani, 2016). Second, appropriate sensitivity to self-performance 
is important when interacting with others (Bahrami et al., 2010; Shea et al., 2014), allowing 
communication of degrees of belief to improve group decision-making and avoid overconfident 
testimony (e.g. in an eyewitness context; Busey et al., 2000). Finally, metacognition is a potential 
target of interventions in psychiatric disorders including schizophrenia and depression (Moritz & 
Woodward, 2007). Developing tools to improve metacognitive abilities may therefore have 
widespread impact in a variety of settings. Here, despite obtaining evidence for generalization to an 
untrained task, such “transfer” was limited to a suite of computerized, 2-alternative forced choice 
tasks with confidence ratings. Further work is needed to assess whether metacognitive training has 
more widespread benefits for unrelated tasks and/or for learning contexts that place demands on 
metacognitive control.  
Our results open up new questions regarding the nature of the malleability of metacognition 
displayed in the present study. Specifically, the duration and generality of improvements in 
introspective abilities remain to be determined. We might expect improvements in the ability to 
introspect about self-performance to be accompanied by changes in brain structure, function, and/or 
connectivity within frontoparietal networks previously implicated in supporting metacognition 
(Fleming et al., 2010; Fleming and Dolan, 2012; McCurdy et al., 2013; Baird et al., 2013; Allen et al., 
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2016; Cortese et al., 2017). A distinction has recently been drawn between lower-level (and 
potentially generic) signals of confidence and higher-order elaboration of such signals for use in 
communication and control (Fleming & Dolan, 2012; Morales et al., 2018). By combining the current 
behavioural intervention with neuroimaging measures it may be possible to determine whether one or 
both of these levels of processing are affected by metacognitive training. Ongoing work in our 
laboratory is tackling this question. 
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